The Kosovo country report reads like a ritual of bureaucratic self-assurance, recycled language, carefully selective optimism, and an illusion of marginal progress bordering on stagnation. While reports on other countries in the region discuss candidate status, opening chapters, and enlargement momentum, the Kosovo report plays creatively with words, signalling the gradual lifting of punitive measures imposed by the EU. Meanwhile, Kosovo’s membership application has been collecting dust since 2022, while Brussels pats itself on the back for the long-delayed visa-free regime, heralded once again as the main achievement for Kosovo.

Yet the EU tries to talk about progress in Kosovo. This progress is tied to the so-called “lifting of punitive measures,” presented as a breakthrough when, in reality, it is partial, conditional, and largely symbolic. Some mechanisms, such as Stabilisation and Association Agreement meetings and a few technical assistance projects, have presumably resumed. Yet major funding and investment remain on hold, leaving Kosovo to bear the political and financial cost. The EU acknowledges some progress that could contribute to lifting the measures, such as the Kosovo Serbs’ participation in the February 2025 general and October 2025 local elections, especially the return of Serb mayors to four northern municipalities. But this recognition remains marginal, treated only as a “good starting point.” The EU continues to demand further steps from Kosovo, such as integrating the police and judiciary in line with the 2013 Brussels Agreement. Clearly, the noted progress should be taken with a grain of salt, and there is still a long way ahead.

While the EU reveals political limitations in its approach to Kosovo’s membership application, the report almost desperately tries to identify some progress on reforms for this reporting year. Unfortunately, this proves a near-impossible task, like searching for a needle in a haystack. It was a depressing year in Kosovo; the domestic political landscape cannot be captured by the word stagnation alone, because it goes far beyond that. For much of the period covered by the report, Kosovo was under a caretaker government, with limited competencies and a focus on political survival rather than advancing reforms.

To make this situation even more daunting, the general elections of February 9, 2025, were preceded by months of informal early campaigning beginning in September 2024, fuelling polarisation, intense political competition, and boycotts as parties focused on the electoral race. Even when a legitimate parliament and government were in place, the legislative agenda faltered due to boycotts, pointless extraordinary sessions, and a lack of political will to advance critical reforms.

While the crisis deepened at the central level, political parties continued their year-long campaigning, dragging it through to the October local elections. During this period, the line between national- and local-level politics became increasingly blurred. Although outside the reporting timeframe, the second round of local elections is scheduled for November 9. This process involves candidates who are ministers in the caretaker government and sworn-in members of parliament, simultaneously running for mayorships, further exposing the hypocrisy, power grabs, and opportunism of political parties in all directions. Amid this chaotic political race, technical discussions on the EU reform agenda, judicial reforms, public administration reform, and broader state fundamentals were sidelined.

Kosovo’s political immaturity reveals a critical contradiction: the elite demand that EU punitive measures be lifted while deliberately and actively blocking the EU Growth Plan by refusing to ratify it in the parliament. Initially presented as a significant breakthrough, the Growth Plan reform agenda was submitted without delay. Yet, progress has stalled, and the first tranche of funds could not be accessed due to the absence of a legitimate parliament. The Commission frames this as mere “implementation delay,” but the deeper problem is structural: political stalemate has eroded Kosovo’s capacity for meaningful reform.

Yet, in a report that gives no reason to celebrate, Kurti’s praise of the EU Progress Report as evidence of Kosovo’s European alignment borders on self-congratulation. The report draws intentional correlations between Kosovo’s alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and its relations with the EU, marked by isolation. The supposed “progress in external relations” is symbolic mainly. Alignment with the EU CFSP, particularly toward Russia, has long been voluntary. In practice, it costs Kosovo little and earns even less. Aligning against Russia may signal a pro-EU posture, but deliberately blocking ratification of the EU Growth Plan and blocking the EU agenda proves otherwise, for instance.

However, Kurti is not the only actor displaying delusion. The report claims that the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia continued during the reporting period. In reality, it remained effectively frozen. Despite repeated attempts to meet in Brussels and resume the technical dialogue, including trilateral negotiations under EU Special Representative Peter Sørensen, the process yielded little beyond procedural formalities. Kosovo lacks a legitimate government to lead the process, while Serbia is internally unstable, limiting its engagement. The fact that both countries participated is technically correct but misleading: participation was modest, largely formal, and produced no tangible results. Each meeting functioned more as a performative gesture than a space for progress.

Similarly, the EU’s approach to the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities demonstrates its repetitive, formulaic strategy. Kosovo is pressured to implement the ASM as a routine obligation, while Serbia is expected merely to “stay committed.” This approach has been attempted for over a decade with no success. Instead, the EU persists with the same script, expecting repetition to yield different outcomes. Brussels has become a theatre of ritualised failure as the EU’s credibility as a mediator quietly erodes. A self-critical approach acknowledging this reality would have been far more credible than recycling standard diplomatic phrases.

As such, the Kosovo Country Report documents not just a wasted year for Kosovo, but also for the EU. Political paralysis in Kosovo and strategic fatigue in Brussels have reinforced one another, producing a cycle of stagnation that benefits neither side. The EU congratulates itself on dated gestures, such as visa liberalisation, and on symbolic progress, such as the gradual lifting of measures, while withholding the substantive support Kosovo needs. Meanwhile, Kosovo remains trapped in an endless cycle of crisis and elections that will likely stretch until the president’s mandate ends in March 2026. Until then, the EU Growth Plan remains on hold, as do critical reforms.