
The 56th World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, held between January 19-23, reflected an international order defined by profound structural shifts and growing insecurity, where historic alliances are being renegotiated. Under Donald Trump, a United States (U.S.) foreign policy marked by a strategy of intimidation and escalation, as well as pronounced unpredictability and open dismissal of multilateral norms, has altered the EU’s strategic environment, generating renewed urgency for deeper internal cohesion and rapid collective action.
Caught between competing powers, small states in the Western Balkans (WB6) are left to calculate their survival, especially, when this volatility is formalized through new initiatives, such as Trump’s so-called Board of Peace, an aspiring international body initially promoted as a peace plan for the Gaza Strip in Palestine, but having since evolved into a broader alternative to the United Nations (U.N.).
The Board claims to coordinate worldwide security, despite deep controversies, such as power being indefinitely centralized in Trump’s hands, peace processes bypassing international law and existing judicial institutions; cooperation being largely transactional and asymmetrical, excluding affected countries and populations (such as Palestinians in Gaza); and the Board gathering extreme-right and autocratic leaders like Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko, Argentinian president Javier Milei, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or Azerbaijani’s Ilham Aliyev to name a few.
In addition, the Board adopts an explicitly financialized membership model, whereby permanent seats are contingent upon a one-billion-dollar contribution, and non-paying members are confined to three-year mandates. An arrangement which is already being exploited politically, as demonstrated by Putin’s conditional acceptance of the fee, in which he attempted to leverage frozen Russian assets as the source of payment.
Democratic countries such as Canada and EU states besides Hungary and Bulgaria, have declined the invitation, citing adherence to international law, the U.N., and multilateral principles as their primary reasons. However, for the WB6, where individual states are geopolitically weak and dependent on external forces, participation in such initiatives is less a choice or endorsement of mutual principles than it is a pragmatic calculation driven by deep uncertainties.
Thus far, Kosovo and Albania have accepted Trump’s invitation to be part of the Board of Peace, yet they diverge in the ways they have chosen to perform diplomacy. This lies in Kosovo’s and Albania’s different international status: Kosovo continues to struggle for recognition and legitimacy, whereas Albania participates fully into Euro-Atlantic structures as both a NATO member and an EU candidate country. Therefore, Kosovo, under President Vjosa Osmani, not only signed the document establishing the Board of Peace during a Trump-led ceremony in Davos, but also publicly endorsed the initiative, reaffirming Kosovo’s unwavering alignment with the U.S. and emphasizing Washington’s role as a global peacekeeper.
Kosovo remains highly dependent on U.S. political backing and cannot afford to sever relations with Washington, especially given that several EU member states continue to withhold recognition of its independence and its EU accession trajectory remains uncertain. Standing beside the U.S. president as a fully recognized state carries symbolic and practical significance that cannot be overstated.
Yet, there exist far more calibrated and sophisticated ways to navigate diplomacy in such a controversial landscape, and here President Osmani fell short. Her public statements and overperformative visibility went beyond strategic alignment and crossed into uncritical endorsement. She reproduced Trump’s narrative and displayed a form of diplomatic theatrics rooted in provincial insecurity, symptomatic of an inferiority complex and an anxious need for validation on the global stage: it was unnecessary and undignified to say the least.
But while Osmani absorbed the reputational costs of accepting Trumpism as a security guarantee, Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who was also in Davos, kept a low profile, avoided Trump altogether, and instead engaged in careful diplomacy, endorsing politically progressive and economically key actors while preserving ties to the EU. He left the “dirty work” to Osmani, and she excelled at it, which also reflects the internal power dynamics of Kosovo’s leadership: Osmani serves Kurti because while she takes the symbolic risks, he balances international alignment with purposeful restraint and safeguards the country’s long-term tactical interests.
On the other hand, Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama chose to act more cautiously: he did not sign the founding statute of Trump’s Board of Peace. Instead, he diplomatically accepted and endorsed the invitation and even pushed Parliament to ratify it, but Albania has signed no official agreement. Edi Rama is not committing to anything, he’s just giving the impression that he is, thus, selling endorsement to the Americans while maintaining diplomatic balance with the Europeans.
Rama deliberately avoided participating in Davos and chose not to delegate a high-level Albanian representative such as the President or the Foreign Minister to the inaugural Board of Peace meeting. He is highly intuitive and has repeatedly demonstrated a keen understanding of how to navigate the international arena. Rama knows precisely when to play the clown in Brussels, drawing attention to his white sneakers and politically incorrect jokes instead of confronting issues of rule of law, corruption, and organized crime and he also knew that, considering the composition of the Board of Peace, attending would not reflect well on him, particularly at a moment of strained relations between the U.S. and the EU.
Nonetheless, Rama, too, cannot afford to publicly oppose Trump. As the leader of a geopolitically marginal country, he does not have leverage on the global stage. Yet he also cannot appear to “betray” the EU, particularly at a moment when accession promises remain on the table. That is why he found an almost elegant solution to this dilemma: hosting a dinner with Ivanka Trump in the coastal town of Vlora to discuss business plans over Sazani Island. Framing the engagement in patriarchal terms, as a matter between father and daughter, he tactically argued to have “chosen” the daughter—with her father’s permission—instead of being in Davos with Trump, signaling engagement with the U.S. while preserving his EU-oriented stance.
Rama’s entire career was forged in the violent anarchy of the Balkans in the 1990s. He knows how to communicate with “tough guys”; he knows how to “honor” them, entertain them, and please them because he is one of them, despite the asymmetry of power, but right now he understands he has to keep it well with all sides until further notice.
As the tectonic plates of global politics continue to shift, it is only reasonable for countries such as Albania or Kosovo not to move forward blindly with Trump’s plans, based solely on the romanticization of historical alliances. History has changed. History is changing. This requires vigilance and tactical diplomacy. Albania and Kosovo, alongside the other Western Balkan states, cannot risk yielding to a framework that normalizes autocratic governance and far-right extremism, erodes the authority of international institutions such as the U.N., and is hostile toward the EU and other democratic actors.
What happens if Trump is impeached or loses the next election? Small states would be left having invested political capital into Trump’s narcissistic mockery. Instead, both Albania and Kosovo should remain focused on their EU integration paths and be further encouraged to do so, rather than drifting into risky transactional games or investing in initiatives that lack institutional legitimacy and binding guarantees of relevance.
The EU is both responsible and possesses the political leverage to strengthen engagement with the WB6 rather than risk its further alienation. It can intensify efforts to secure recognition of Kosovo from its remaining five non-recognizing member states—Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus—and genuinely deliver on the enlargement process, as a unified Europe is now, more than ever, an urgent geopolitical necessity rather than a mere aspiration.