On May 11, Albania will hold parliamentary elections to elect 140 members of parliament and, indirectly, determine the next Prime Minister—typically the leader of the party or coalition that secures a majority. While elections in Albania are held regularly, the country operates under a semi-authoritarian system featured by competitive authoritarianism.

The political playing field remains heavily skewed: state institutions are widely regarded as captured, and the electoral process is frequently marred by irregularities and systemic interference—typically benefiting the ruling Socialist Party of Albania (SP), led by incumbent Prime Minister Edi Rama.

The electoral system in Albania is based on proportional representation, which includes both closed and open party lists. Closed lists involve voters selecting a party rather than individual candidates, with seats allocated according to the candidates’ predetermined order on the list. In contrast, open lists allow citizens to vote directly for individual candidates proposed by each party. It is important to note that two-thirds of the lists are formally open, while one-third remain closed.

However, candidates on the open lists can only be elected if those on the closed list either secure victory first or choose to resign. As such, the system is disputed, as it helps maintain the status quo by strengthening autocratic party leaders who have the power to determine the order of candidates, ensuring that the most loyal members within the party are guaranteed seats. For example, the Democratic Party of Albania (DP) under Sali Berisha has placed him and his close associates on the closed party lists. Similarly, the SP has done the same with Rama and his confidants.

In these elections, the mainstream opposition parties have decided to run as a united front, forming a coalition of 24 right-wing and conservative parties, dominated by the DP under Berisha, who until recently was under house arrest for abuse of power, and the Freedom Party (Partia e Lirisë, PL), rebranded from the Socialist Movement for Integration (Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrim, LSI), whose leader Ilir Meta is currently in prison for corruption and abuse of power.

Running under the slogan Alliance for Great Albania, these elections mark a decisive shift in the historic opposition’s ideological foundations. Once largely devoid of clear ideological commitment, these cartel-parties have recently embraced Trump-style populism, especially as legal scrutiny of their leadership intensifies domestically. With Donald Trump back in the White House, they are pinning their hopes on his administration to bolster their political survival. But, ironically, it is Rama who is primarily engaged in business dealings with the Trump family, particularly concerning the controversial plan to transfer Sazan Island, located in the Albanian Riviera, for development by Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

Also on the opposition front, but running independently, is the Euroatlantic Coalition (KEA) founded by Lulzim Basha, former mayor of Tirana and a key figure in one of the factions opposing Berisha within the DP. Despite the fact that Endri Hasa is currently the official leader of the KEA, Basha remains the strongman within the party. While nominally right-wing, the party is largely devoid of clear ideology and primarily serves as a springboard for Basha’s return to power. However, its rhetoric contrasts with the newer, more Trump-style populism that the DP has embraced, as the KEA seeks to maintain a more sportive approach and preserve DP’s former ties with the EU.

Electoral Novelty: Grassroots Political Parties

A key feature of these elections is the rise of new parties that have emerged from civil society in recent years: notably, the Together Movement (Lëvizja Bashkë, LB) and the Initiative Albania Becomes (Nisma Shqipëria Bëhet, NSHB) coalition, formed by the Hashtag Initiative (Nisma Thurje, NTH) and Albania Becomes (Shqipëria Bëhet, SHB) parties. They signal a significant shift in the Albanian political landscape and are driven not only by widespread disillusionment with the political scene that has dominated Albania for the past 34 years, but also by the absence of viable political alternatives free from connections with the old political class or criminal networks. Ideologically distinct, they are in clear competition with each other for their role and leadership in the new opposition front, unlike the mainstream parties, which lack legitimacy and where power is maintained by force.

LB, led by Arlind Qori, a lecturer at the University of Tirana, has emerged from the structures of the Political Organization (Organizata Politike, OP)—a radical left movement formed in Tirana in 2011. Its identity is rooted in efforts to build democratic workers’ unions and the student movement For the University (Lëvizja Për Universitetin), which played a key role in the 2018–2019 student protests. LB represents the only working-class alternative in these elections and its objective extends beyond merely securing a parliamentary seat as they aim to establish a nationwide movement that challenges the current political establishment and introduces a new approach to political engagement through grassroots mobilization.

NTH, led by university lecturer Endri Shabani, identifies as a social-democratic party that seeks to represent Albania’s middle class while advocating for policies that promote meritocracy, transparency, and economic development. NTH’s activist legacy is grounded in legal and institutional efforts to address social justice, corruption, and governance, aligning with Shabani’s background in law. Following his election to the Tirana Municipal Council in 2023, Shabani has further consolidated his political career which initially began through involvement in non-governmental organizations such as Transparency International. Briefly, in 2012, he was part of the Red and Black Alliance (Aleanca Kuq e Zi), a nationalist party from which he later distanced himself to focus exclusively on civil society initiatives.

SHB, led by Adriatik Lapaj, is a center-right and populist party, marked by conservative and nationalist rhetoric. Previously, Lapaj too had been involved with the Red and Black Alliance and later with NTH, from which he separated to establish SHB.

It is expected that LB and the NSHB coalition will secure a modest number of seats in parliament, marking their first entry into the legislative body.

The Diaspora Vote

For the first time, Albanians living abroad have the right to participate in elections through postal voting. However, the likelihood that the diaspora vote will impact the final election result is slim for several reasons, including Albania’s semi-authoritarian regime, co-opted institutions, and a flawed electoral process.

Moreover, Albania’s diaspora is fragmented, politically disengaged, and its connection to the homeland is predominantly driven by nationalist and sentimental attachments, which makes it easier for the ruling party to exploit it, particularly given its access to the resources and mechanisms needed to mobilize support networks and voters abroad. Rama has been running an extensive overseas campaign for several months, with a focus on countries hosting significant Albanian communities, including Italy, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United States, while strategically leveraging the diaspora’s nationalism and emotional ties to Albania.

The Ruling Socialist Party Under Edi Rama: Consolidation and Perseverance

Since assuming leadership of the SP in 2005, Rama has strengthened the party’s connections with economic elites, especially local oligarchs and informal groups, thus transforming it into a transactional entity with a neoliberal image, while largely sidelining its ideological roots. This shift has fostered a symbiotic relationship between political and economic power, further entrenching the party’s dominance in Albania’s political landscape, which has led to the preferential treatment of specific business groups, fostering a clientelist system frequently accused of state capture, the subordination of public policies to private interests, and involvement in money laundering.

Additionally, Rama has weakened broader party structures and opposition voices, thereby consolidating a leadership style that is both more centralized and personalized. Currently, the SP is the dominant political force in Albania, exerting control over the majority of key institutions and political processes.

In these elections, Rama has fully instrumentalized the EU’s stabilitocratic support of his governance, turning it into a tool for his electoral campaign. Namely, despite his consolidated power, he still seeks a degree of legitimacy—not only among the general public but also within his own party, especially in the wake of recent internal rifts within the SP and a broader climate of fear following the arrest of many of its members. Although Rama is likely to secure a fourth term after 12 years in power, it is evident that his dominant role within the SP and in Albania’s political scene appears to be followed by more anxiety than before.