“Everyone who lives in Kosjerić came out to vote against us, and there were still more people who voted for us.”
Aleksandar Vučić after local elections in Kosjerić
For the first time since the dawn of student protests - the largest movement in Serbia’s recent history, sparked by the deadly collapse at the Novi Sad train station - local elections were held in the municipalities of Zaječar and Kosjerić. On June 8, all eyes turned to the two towns - home to roughly 55,000 people - as they became a symbolic testing ground for the resilience of the Vučić regime, amid growing calls for early parliamentary elections.
Ultimately, the ruling Serbian Progressive Party’s (SNS) list ‘We Won’t Give up Serbia’ claimed victory, as opposition disputed the results and independent observers reported widespread voter intimidation, fraud, and misuse of public resources. While this script is all too familiar, the democratic momentum ignited by the student movement largely set these elections apart, fostering unprecedented public oversight and record voter turnout (+11.2% in Zaječar and +14.6% in Kosjerić).
As a result, despite the full-scale mobilisation of the ruling party’s machinery - including distribution of agricultural equipment, busing in external voters, and last-minute road paving - elections were bitterly fought. Particularly in Kosjerić, where a united opposition, backed for the first time by student support, lost by just 51 votes, while a partial re-vote ordered by the Užice Higher Court, held amid widespread fear and intimidation, failed to deliver a much-hoped-for overturn. Numbers aside, recent local elections have been far more than a ‘lost opportunity’.
Namely, they showed that sustained public pressure, and synergy between students and opposition, can effectively challenge and expose the mechanisms of electoral manipulation that have long propped up the Vučić regime, casting serious doubt on their effectiveness, especially if nationwide elections were to be held.
Serbia’s Regime Between Fading Legitimacy and Growing Repression
Serbian students, mostly part of a ‘Generation Z’ long dismissed as apolitical, emerged as enablers of a broader civic awakening, channeling the emotional shockwave of the Novi Sad tragedy into a powerful ‘call against kleptocracy’ capable of bringing the deadly nexus between entrenched corruption, state capture, and democratic backsliding, to the attention of the domestic public. The impact extended far beyond the student community, triggering what a government-commissioned poll confirmed as the regime’s deepest legitimacy crisis to date, with only one-third expressing confidence in Vučić, and nearly 60% supporting student protests and their demands.
SNS’s Pyrrhic victory in recent local elections only reinforced this trend, as student monitors and domestic NGOs (international observers were notably absent) crowded polling stations exposing“ systemic institutional pressures, media bias, and physical violence“, and revealing the regime’s increasing dependence on a growing informal machinery to secure victory amid declining popularity. According to CRTA and Transparency Serbia, several million euros were spent during the pre-election period, fuelling vote-buying schemes and last-minute infrastructural projects, while over 50 state and party officials visited the two towns, far more than in the last four years combined.
Such levels of mobilization - barely sufficient to win small provincial towns - are unlikely to be sustainable in a nationwide election, particularly in the face of a united opposition, rising domestic and international pressure, higher voter turnout, and better-organised student monitoring.
Cooptation? A lose-lose agreement
Its unchallenged monopoly on power and resources allowed the Vučić regime to secure the loyalty of key political actors. Most notably that of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) which, holding a long record of shifting allegiances, has shared the spoils of power with SNS since 2012. However, besides small and ethnic-minority parties, key figures from the Democratic Party, one of the main opposition parties, have also been coopted into the SNS orbit, former minister Tanja Miščević and Belgrade Mayor Aleksandar Šapić, to name a few.
This pattern is even more pronounced at the local level, where the ruling coalition controls all 174 municipalities and where, far from public scrutiny, it has systematically divided rival formations to prevent the emergence of insurgentpolitical enclaves. A striking example is Ljig, Western Serbia, where, under SNS pressure, two opposition councilors switched sides after the tight results of the 2024 elections, triggering relatively large protests.
Recent local elections are no different, with Vučić’s plea to “find common ground”, addressing opposition members in Zaječar and Kosjerić, sounding like a call for defection. However, once again, student protests appear to have changed the stakes.
On the one hand, while students consistently voiced harsh criticism of an opposition discredited by multiple defections, the pragmatic coalition that made it to the local elections proved successful. Considering the movement’s refusal to institutionalise, it also remains the only viable way to challenge SNS rule.
On the other hand, though careful to keep to the sidelines and not disrupt the movement’s civic character, mainstream opposition proved eager to rebrand itself and ride the protests’ momentum, particularly eyeing anticipated parliamentary elections. In such a climate, with students’ watchful eyes monitoring any SNS overtures, cooptation has likely lost much of its appeal among opposition members who, now more than ever, are encouraged to stick together.
Ironically, it is the SNS-SPS coalition to shows its first cracks, with the Socialists facing growing discontent after the “catastrophic results” in Zaječar where - for the first time in their history - they failed to pass the 3% threshold.As voices grow within the party lamenting excessive servility and complete subordination to SNS, it appears that, in an increasingly personalised regime reluctant to share power, cooptation is turning into a lose-lose agreement that neither party is eager to uphold.
Conclusion: The Last Call for EU Credibility
SNS’s threat to cancel upcoming local elections, should the “undemocratic atmosphere” of Zaječar and Kosjerić recur, offers yet another indication that, caught between fading legitimacy and a declining cooptation effectiveness, the Vučić regime is increasingly turning to repression to maintain power. As the façade of democratic competitiveness crumbles, it stands at a crossroads: either it drops the mask and reveals its authoritarian nature, or it will likely lose power to genuine democratic change.
Sustaining domestic momentum and exposing SNS’s undemocratic practices have been key successes of the student movement, which took to the streets over 5,200 times since November. The powerful June 28 protest in Belgrade, met by the authorities with police brutality and several arrests, further underscored that students cannot overcome an increasingly repressive system alone: the EU remains the sole actor with both the capacity and responsibility to support them at this pivotal moment. So far, however, the EU has enabled authoritarianism in Serbia, advancing stabilitocracy and partisan interests over democratic values.
Without a paradigm shift in Brussels, Belgrade risks sliding down the same authoritarian path of Tbilisi and Ankara, empowering aspiring autocrats and inviting disruptive external influence across the Western Balkans. This would not only deliver a fatal blow to the EU’s credibility among candidate countries but, amid escalating geopolitical threats, threaten the security and stability of the Union itself.