The Brussels-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is stuck. Despite a supposed breakthrough agreement in 2023 following negotiations in Ohrid and Brussels, relations between the two countries continue to deteriorate and there is little appetite for progress in either capital amid existential domestic challenges. The inhabitants of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo are caught in the crosshairs, as Kosovo authorities have closed parallel institutions financed from Belgrade, depriving large parts of the population of social benefits. As the stalemate is likely to continue for months, the new EU team can play an important role in facilitating practical solutions on the ground, preventing a further disintegration and marginalization of Kosovo Serbs and other vulnerable groups.

Dialogue in limbo, unraveling on the ground

Endorsed by the UN General Assembly, the high-level dialogue commenced in 2011 with four key goals: as a “factor for peace, security and stability in the region”; “to promote cooperation”; “achieve progress on the path to the European Union”; and “improve the lives of the people”. There have been successes in all areas, especially on the technical level, but no final political settlement has been accomplished. Many of the roughly 90 agreements still await (full) implementation, and the past years have seen alarming regress, especially when it comes to the lives of the people most affected by the lack of normalization. As a result, the dialogue is operating in crisis mode rather than producing results on the ground.

This is especially true for the Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo. Since 2021, Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s government has dismantled parallel Serbian institutions it deemed illegal. In a move instigated by Belgrade, Kosovo Serbs resigned en masse from public posts in November 2022, leaving the community without representation on the national, municipal, and judicial level, as well as in the police. Local elections in the four northern municipalities of Leposavić, North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan were subsequently boycotted, leading to the election of non-Serb mayors, which were followed by violent riots. When a terrorist group around notorious Serb businessman Milan Radoičić killed a policeman near Banjska in September 2023 and Serbian forces gathered at the border, fears of renewed conflicts spiked.

Subsequently, the Kosovo government deemed the parallel institutions run by Serbia a security threat and initiated their closure. While the issue of parallel institutions was already addressed in the 2013 Brussels Agreement, solutions have regularly been postponed. The dinar ban and closure of offices administering social benefits affect roughly 90 percent of Serb-majority municipalities’ inhabitants, without offering alternatives. The EU and its member states have meanwhile increased pressure on Prishtina to initiate another key agreement, namely the creation of an Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (A/CSM) to facilitate a re-integration of Serbs into the Kosovo structures and strengthen their participation. Its proposed statutes foresee significant autonomy in education, healthcare, urban and rural planning, and economy. However, with current government crises in both countries – ongoing mass protest in Serbia and the blocking of parliament formation in Kosovo – neither leader is prone to meaningful engagement, while the local population is once more paying the price of political deadlock.

Prioritizing the local

With no clear will by both governments to overcome the political stalemate, the EU, as the facilitator of the dialogue, finds itself in a peculiar position. Overall, it has been more successful in facilitating the implementation of technical agreements than high-level political ones. A case in point was the successful integration (until November 2022) of the Police and Judiciary in Serb-majority municipalities. The EU should therefore once again focus on the local level and seek solutions to outstanding issues that hamper the daily lives of non-majority communities, particularly regarding parallel structures such as schools, healthcare facilities, and social benefit systems.

In order to be successful, a new approach to dialogue must ensure ownership of proposed solutions by the local communities. The EU has always lacked a profound engagement with civil society and change-makers on the ground, which in the past made successful integration hinge on the cooperation of Belgrade and its clientelist networks on the ground. The dialogue has therefore always been elite-driven and is currently held hostage by them. The constant crisis management in the dialogue, especially in the northern municipalities, is a direct result of this dynamic that the EU has inadvertently created. Additionally, the unilateral moves of Prishtina – from the closure of essential parallel institutions for social services provision, to the securitization of north Kosovo – have made the situation worse, increasing resentment and insecurity in the non-majority communities. This “forced integration” does not facilitate loyalty to the Kosovo system, especially if no viable alternatives are offered, but in fact achieves the opposite. In addition, local needs are not prioritized by the Serbian side, with Belgrade regularly instrumentalizing rather than addressing them. Without ownership of the dialogue at the local level and sustainable stability in the north, this area will continue to be a crisis hotbed – as observed in the last few years.

Given the current Kosovo government’s tendency to close parallel institutions that provide social security – a move that was off-limits for previous governments – solutions for the affected communities must be prioritized. The current situation forces many Kosovo Serbs to travel hundreds of kilometers to Serbia to receive social benefits, while those who for different reasons cannot obtain Kosovo ID cards fear they will soon be stranded. Without solving the issue of social benefits, parallel education, and health care, there will be an even more community fragmentation and out-migration of Serbs from Kosovo, especially from the north. Other non-majority communities, such as Gorani, Bosniaks, or Roma, also rely on services provided by these parallel structures and are similarly affected. The EU should take the dire situation regarding human security in Serb-majority municipalities more seriously, as it is the main cause of this out-migration. These institutions may seem less political, but they ensure community survival and are vital to quality of life, so they must not be treated like other parallel institutions.

In order to move forward, the EU could suggest practical solutions for these institutions based on existing models within the Union. The German schools abroad model could provide a solution for Serbia-run schools, while the German-speaking Andrassy University in Hungary could serve as a model for the Serbia-run University in North Mitrovica. Solutions for institutions in the social domain should be adapted to local circumstances and must address the most pressing needs of the people affected. More diplomatic weight should also be put behind facilitating them. While there is currently no political momentum for (fully) implementing the A/CSM, these practical solutions could lay the groundwork for future institutionalization, and would ensure local legitimacy.

The upcoming municipal elections in Kosovo, planned for autumn 2025, offer a window of opportunity to start (re-)engaging at the local level, since the Kosovo Serbs have announced their participation, which could end the institutional stalemate that has existed since 2022 and facilitate their re-integration. The EU should use it as a catalyst to not only consult with the elites – as is the current practice – but extend its consultations and active involvement in the dialogue and its possible solutions to the local civil society and change-makers. Only this way can it ensure that the dialogue fulfills its fourth, and arguably most important goal: to improve the lives of people on the ground.