Montenegro seems to be caught in a kind of European delirium - ask the prime minister, a taxi driver, or even a five-year-old in the street, and they will tell you without hesitation that we are definitely joining the EU in 2028. In reality, that is hardly an objective assessment. It is more like a game of double bluff: we sit at the poker table without a single ace in hand, yet act as if we hold them all. Across the table sits the European Union - perfectly aware of our cards, yet humoring us as though we were in a position to bargain.
Still, for the reasons I outlined in the BiEPAG brief “From Norms to Noise: Why the EU Talks Reform but Fuels Decline in the Balkans”, Montenegro’s accession by 2028 or 2029 is not only possible - it is urgently needed. There have been some positive signals at the EU level: lately, there has been increasing talk of drafting an accession treaty during Denmark’s EU presidency - one that, with clearly defined safeguard clauses, would serve both corrective and incentive-based functions. Recently, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Luc Frieden told the European Parliament that the EU should establish a shorter and clearer timeframe for aspiring members, and that a decision on Montenegro’s accession should be made next year. Similarly, the Commissioner for Enlargement has repeatedly mentioned a potential accession date - most likely within the current European Commission’s mandate - and similar messages have been echoed by other EU institutions and member states.
The most tangible sign of progress is Montenegro’s roadmap for closing all negotiation chapters by the end of 2026 - a plan already endorsed by the European Commission. It is, of course, highly ambitious and realistically achievable only with numerous transitional periods across most chapters. Complicating factors include the political mood in certain EU capitals and the unpredictability of national ratification processes. Is it feasible? I do not know - but I still hope so.
Yet that is not the real point of this reflection. The point is that as long as there remains even the slightest chance for any country in the region to join the European Union, solidarity must be the first word that comes to mind for everyone in the Western Balkans. And here is why.
I first raised the issue of lacking regional solidarity at the tenth anniversary of the BiEPAG initiative in Sarajevo in October 2024. As the only Montenegrin in the room, I asked why the mere mention of Montenegro potentially joining the EU provokes almost automatic skepticism or even irony. Admittedly, this is partly a reaction to the EU’s own inconsistencies - its unfulfilled promises, the absence of a clear vision, and the constant prioritization of internal reform over enlargement. However, Montenegro’s possible accession would also silence the autocrats across the region who claim that enlargement is impossible, that Brussels is to blame for everything, and that the EU’s reluctance to integrate the region justifies their own failures. Moreover, we should not forget that some regional actors actively destabilize Montenegro’s political landscape through allies within its own government. What is more concerning, though, is that this lack of solidarity extends beyond political elites and reaches other spheres - including civil society itself.
It is worth recalling that civil society organizations across the region have often shown solidarity with student protests in Belgrade as a bright example of regional civic spirit. The public outcry over the lithium mining deal was another instance of shared awareness and regional mobilization. These examples show that solidarity thrives when it is horizontal and civic in nature - yet it tends to disappear when the discussion turns to enlargement. There are no negative consequences, no political costs that Montenegro’s EU membership could have for other Western Balkan countries. On the contrary - all potential effects are positive.
Montenegro’s accession could restore the credibility of EU enlargement, proving that conditionality still works and that reforms, not rhetoric, bring results. It would create a long-awaited success story in a region trapped in transition, showing that even small, reform-oriented states can achieve tangible progress. A well-designed draft accession treaty with post-accession mechanisms could serve as a model for the rest of the Western Balkans. Montenegro was the first country to undergo the EU’s revised, stricter approach - with rule-of-law chapters opened at the very beginning and kept open until the end; the first with interim benchmarks and only with the IBAR (Interim Benchmark Assessment Report); and the only one with a roadmap for closing negotiation chapters. This makes it an ideal testing ground for developing a model that others could follow.
Membership would also generate a valuable spillover of institutional experience. Montenegro’s administration - through its post-accession mechanisms, management of EU funds, and participation in common policies - would gain expertise that could be shared with neighbors, strengthening their own reform capacities. At the same time, an EU member from the Western Balkans would provide the region with a much -needed voice inside the Union, advocating for enlargement from within and keeping regional issues visible in Brussels - much as Slovenia once did after its own accession.
Geopolitically, Montenegro’s membership would send a strong signal at a time when external actors continue to compete for influence in the region. It would reaffirm that alignment with the EU’s values and strategic interests brings real benefits, while weakening narratives that justify authoritarianism under the pretext of “strategic autonomy.” Economically, one new member would accelerate integration into the single market, stimulate investment, and enhance cross-border cooperation, creating ripple effects throughout the region.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Montenegro’s membership would carry symbolic and psychological weight. It would prove that EU accession is not a myth or an endless waiting room, but a reachable goal. That message alone - that reform and perseverance can still lead to success – could reawaken optimism, restore trust in the European project, and inspire the entire region to move forward.
Ultimately, the integration of any Western Balkan state into the EU means one more ally within the Union - an advocate for democratic reforms, stability, and shared prosperity. The logic of solidarity is simple: when one of us moves forward, the entire region stands a better chance. Montenegro’s progress is not a threat to its neighbors; it is a test of whether the idea of a common European future for the Western Balkans still holds.