Kosovo’s December 2025 snap elections ended a year of political deadlock by delivering Vetëvendosje a rare, near-absolute mandate. With more than 51 percent of the vote and over 400,000 votes for the list led by Albin Kurti, the party secured 57 of 120 parliamentary seats, enough to govern alone. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) trailed far behind.

Few expected Kurti to repeat, let alone improve on his 2021 result. Yet the outcome marks a decisive consolidation of power after the inconclusive February 2025 elections, which left Kosovo without a functional government for almost a year. The December vote breaks that deadlock and gives Vetëvendosje a strong hand not only in forming a government but also in the presidential election scheduled for March 2026, an issue that had paralyzed the country’s politics throughout 2025. Kosovo now enters a phase of potentially faster and more coherent governance. However, whether this produces stability or new tensions will depend on how Vetëvendosje uses its dominance.

The landslide victory was not merely a product of voter enthusiasm. It was also the result of a carefully strategized and managed political year by Kurti. After winning the February elections without securing a governing majority, Kurti led a caretaker government through months of stalemate. Rather than rushing into a fragile coalition, he allowed the political vacuum to persist while gradually and strategically shaping the narrative in his favour. Although Vetëvendosje, as the winning party, had the formal responsibility to seek partners, Kurti successfully framed the opposition as the main culprit behind the blockage. PDK and LDK relied almost exclusively on vetoes, procedural manoeuvres, and refusals to negotiate, turning obstruction into their defining political identity. Over time, this strategy became impossible to disguise. The opposition’s strategy, or the lack of it, inadvertently played into Kurti’s hands, leaving them looking disorganized and without a clear political direction.

Timing further reinforced Vetëvendosje’s advantage. By scheduling the vote for December 28, Kurti boosted diaspora turnout - which is predominantly Vetëvendosje, while retaining control of the caretaker government and rolling out targeted, ad hoc aid for pensioners, families, and recipients of maternity benefits, alongside promises of wage increases and a public-sector 13th salary. These measures shored up popularity and reinforced Vetëvendosje’s leftist appeal.

Media dynamics amplified the imbalance. Opposition campaigns focused on corruption allegations and personal attacks against Kurti, often delivered in chaotic TV debates. Rather than weakening him, this increased his visibility while allowing him to remain largely absent from the media. His opponents, in effect, did the campaigning for him. Most damaging of all, the opposition offered no alternative vision. Their message was limited to asserting that Kurti was “just as bad” as previous governments and “making concessions in relation to Serbia, without presenting leadership renewal, programmatic innovation, or credible reforms.

International developments also worked in Vetëvendosje’s favour. The suspension of the U.S.–Kosovo Strategic Dialogue and EU punitive measures over tensions in northern Kosovo were framed by opposition parties as existential threats. Yet, this alarmist rhetoric no longer mobilized voters against Kurti. For decades, Kosovo elections were heavily shaped by images of party leaders alongside U.S. or EU officials. That formula is now losing influence. Voters increasingly see international pressure as a constant rather than a decisive variable, and the opposition’s attempt to weaponize these issues backfired, reinforcing the perception that they had little to offer beyond fear.

With its parliamentary majority, Vetëvendosje is positioned to form a one-party government and largely control the March 2026 presidential election. This diminishes the opposition’s ability to block institutions without incurring high political costs. Kurti has already signalled how he intends to govern, describing the opposition not as a partner but as a numerical necessity, and warning that any attempt to block the presidential vote would trigger new elections, ones in which Vetëvendosje would again be well positioned to prevail. This creates a paradox: institutional paralysis is likely over, and a unified executive, parliamentary majority, and presidency could allow for greater efficiency, faster legislation, and the advancement of the Growth Plan Agenda if the opposition does not obstruct it again. At the same time, this concentration of power risks weakening parliamentary oversight and democratic balance, particularly while the opposition remains fragmented.

The December elections were a shock for PDK and LDK and a test of survival. PDK is entering a period of leadership restructuring but remains anchored to the past, defining itself through its historical ties to the Kosovo Liberation Army and clinging to the hope of Hashim Thaçi’s return from The Hague. This focus on the past and future positions current leaders as transitional and limits the party’s capacity to rebuild. LDK, under Lumir Abdixhiku, faces a more profound existential challenge. By avoiding a serious internal reckoning, the party risks marginalization for years. The only viable path forward for both parties is reinvention: internal reform, clear leadership, credible policy alternatives, and constructive parliamentary engagement. Continuation of the obstructionist strategies of 2025 would render them irrelevant.

Kosovo’s domestic reset unfolds against a far more unstable international backdrop. The post-war global order is fragmenting. U.S. support, especially under a Trump-style approach, has become transactional rather than values-based. The EU is distracted, increasingly focused on Albania and Montenegro in the region, while Kosovo remains stalled, signalling doubts about its European trajectory.

The costs of Kosovo’s 2025 paralysis were high: stalled implementation of the Growth Agenda, frozen dialogue with Serbia, lost financial support, and fading diplomatic momentum. The dialogue with Serbia remains blocked due to Kosovo’s internal crisis and Serbia’s domestic turmoil, while the EU has shown little urgency to intervene. Kosovo is caught in a system where strategic partners are less engaged and less willing to invest political capital, while it still lacks consolidated international recognition. Membership in international organizations is increasingly difficult as the U.S., a long-standing partner of Kosovo in these processes, is pulling back from the rules-based multilateral mechanisms.

Yet there is room for strategic action. A stable government could re-engage bilaterally with EU states and Brussels, adopt the Growth Agenda, seek new recognitions, and rebuild ties with the U.S. to restart the strategic dialogue between the two countries. The manner in which Vetëvendosje uses its mandate will define Kosovo’s political era, determining whether this period of dominance becomes a foundation for reform or a source of new instability.