While the global arena has witnessed a solid nine months of relentless, flamboyant norm-busting by the second Trump administration, this dynamic seemed to largely leave previously established American topline policies intact. Of course, the wanton destruction of USAID early in the administration delivered a deep blow in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the rest of the Western Balkans, and – with devastating effect – globally. The wider Trump family engaged in deals, such as deeply controversial developments in Serbia and Albania. And US embassies became far less vocal and interactive with their erstwhile closest partners, including the EU – which has set the pace for the West through its enlargement policy for two decades. But the fundamentals of Washington’s policies pertaining to BiH and the region remained largely consistent, including the sanctions regime against the Republika Srpska (RS) separatist leader – and now convicted criminal and former RS President – Milorad Dodik and a wide circle of his family, associates, party, and connected businesses.
However, beginning in October, the divergence between the US and other Western allies when it came to BiH became clearer. On October 17, sanctions against four RS figures were lifted by the US Department of the Treasury. Thus began about two weeks of genuine puzzlement and rampant speculation as to what might lie below the waterline regarding what many observers had concluded was a US-Dodik deal. On October 29, a major swathe of sanctioned individuals and entities, from Dodik and family and BiH Presidency member Željka Cvijanović on down, had sanctions removed from them following their retreat in the RS Assembly on Oct 18 from a series of anti-Dayton and anti-constitutional, i.e. secessionist acts ( after which Dodik stepped down and his temporary replacement, Ana Trišić Babić was named. However, a host of other anti-Dayton acts remain in place. The following day, on October 30, the UN Security Council, chaired by Russia, met to reauthorize the EU’s EUFOR Althea peace enforcement mission, mandated in the Dayton Peace Agreement (turning 30 on November 21) and undertaken by the EU for nearly 21 years. The force was reauthorized unanimously, allaying fears (including on the part of the author) of a potential veto by Moscow.
The Other Shoe Drops?
The real news from the UNSC session was the marked shift in American tone in the US Ambassador’s remarks. Amb. Dorothy Shea began with continuity, noting that the roles of EUFOR and OHR were essential for stability and security in Bosnia. She called on all parties in BiH to continue the process of de-escalation which began with Dodik’s leaving office – as per the Court of BiH ruling – and the RS Assembly’s retraction. She noted that sanctions, which were never intended to be permanent, but to affect the incentives of Dodik and company, were lifted in recognition of these moves. Her closing statement punctuated the shift in tone: “the United States is no longer pursuing nation-building or heavy-handed international intervention. Now is the time for local solutions, led by local actors representing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s three constituent peoples. These actions reflect a step in that direction and the spirit of U.S. policy.”
The British tone was consistent with past positions – and took a hard line. In addition to welcoming EUFOR’s extension, Minister Counselor Jennifer MacNaughtan stated that Dodik’s actions launched the most serious crisis in 30 years and that the Dayton constitutional order had to be upheld by all. Therefore, High Representative Christian Schmidt and his office needed to be respected. She also underscored that the High Representative was chosen by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the ad hoc body set up to oversee the Dayton Peace Agreement, not the UNSC, in a riposte to the Russian line that Schmidt was illegitimate. EU member Denmark’s Ambassador Christina Markus Lassen took a congruent line, adding that the de-escalation the RS undertook thus far remains incomplete. She called on all in BiH to commit to meeting the requirements for membership of the EU. Other non-permanent, non-European members, such as Panama, the Republic of Korea, and Guyana, made noteworthy statements – with the Guyanese Ambassador the first to mention the 2008 “5+2” formula established to enable closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).
In theory, the US position is now actually closer to the long-term EU institutional posture (against maintenance of OHR) – and that of several member states. However, the connotation of those words in the current political “correlation of forces” (to use the Soviet term) in BiH and in the US is more illuminating.
Apart from the lifting of sanctions from a series of RS figures, signals that the Trump administration might be shifting to a policy more in line with its domestic reactionary and global transactional amoralist posture foreshadowed the October 30 UNSC session. A summit, to take place in Budapest, was announced between Trump and Russia’s neo-imperial ICC indictee President Vladimir Putin. This was later cancelled, however. US Presidential Special Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell weighed in on the ongoing Hashim Thaçi trial. Thaçi and Vučić advocated the so-called “land swap” between Serbia and Kosovo in summer 2018, with both the then-EU foreign and security policy chief Federica Mogherini and the first Trump administration’s openness to it. Trump’s lust for a Nobel Peace Prize was evident then.
What Does This Mean for the EU and BiH Going Forward?
The EC Country Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina, published on November 4, cast a damning light on BiH authorities’ efforts and commitments to their avowed EU membership aspirations, despite their having been effectively gifted candidacy in December 2022, and an equally unearned green light for opening accession negotiations in March 2024. A sizeable majority of the assessed chapters and elements saw “no progress” at all; a number of BiH civic actors thought this was charitable. Furthermore, there was actual backsliding in areas such as governance, civic space, and media freedom, though this evaded designation due to the reporting methodology. The likelihood of serious forward movement between now and the October 2026 elections seems remote, given past practice. Even thereafter, there is scant cause for genuine optimism. Clearly, the EU’s posture – even with money on the table – has not had the desired impact.
Nor has Dodik changed his spots; he appears emboldened by the lifting of US sanctions. On the campaign trail for the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats’ (SNSD) candidate to succeed him in the RS Presidency, Siniša Karan, Dodik employed hate speech against Bosniaks – whom he consistently has been calling “Muslims” – decrying the threat of “Islamicization,” people selling property to them, stating “we are not the same people,” adding “nobody lies worse and more than the ‘Turks’” (another epithet). There are calls for his prosecution for hate speech. One might speculate that he might be attempting to induce such a move, in the hope that he could then employ it as more evidence of his persecution – this time for what is now characterized by Trump officials and supporters as simply “free speech.”
It's worthy of note that Dodik’s talking points are in line with those of both RS-financed lobbyists in the US and congruent with those of other public advocates in the MAGA orbit. For example, the firm that engaged former convicted and pardoned Governor of Illinois Rod Blagojevich in its contract with the RS Government highlights the protection of BiH Christians “ensuring they are free from pressure by Bosnian Muslims and supportive globalist elites.” Furthermore, other right-wing figures, including the influential and controversial Heritage Foundation, advocate for an even more ethnocratic BiH structure than that which prevails under Dayton. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Dayton in May 2025 foreshadowed elements which appeared in the US statement at the UNSC. The correlations with some talking points by Heritage Senior Research Fellow Max Primorac (e.g., a focus on “peoples” not citizens, criticizing allegedly overweening “bureaucrats and activists”) are also evident.
Time to Get Real
This poses a real challenge to the EU, not just in terms of its position in and on Bosnia and Herzegovina, but throughout the region and within its own ranks.
In order of magnitude, the shift in US position on assertive Dayton enforcement seems to portend a potential role reversal for Brussels and member states. As made clear at the UNSC, Denmark advocates a more hardline position; among PIC Steering Board member states, the Netherlands has consistently fit this term and Germany apparently aligned with the UK to defend Schmidt’s position. EU capitals like Berlin have been able to benefit from confidence that Washington and London would maintain a harder edge on BiH policy – and it’s clear the UK remains so inclined. Given understandable fears that America is not genuinely committed to NATO’s Article 5, it is also legitimate to wonder whether the Berlin-plus commitment to EUFOR – including reinforcing it in extremis from bases in Italy and Germany – is still solid.
The EU and its remaining reliable allies (in the “coalition of the willing” on Ukraine) should count on having to hold this ground on their own. Therefore, any remaining attachment to the EU’s institutional legacy position on enforcement tools needs to be jettisoned – at least until the country has a post-Dayton social contract and constitutional order.
Broadening out to the region, the disposition of EU member Croatia, whose foreign policy has been dominated by its fixation on BiH, is overdue for genuine scrutiny. Furthermore, the policy toward Serbia, whose government espouses a “Serbian world” conception regarding BiH, Montenegro, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, has to date never had its EU path cautioned on that account. And this leaves aside the obvious challenge to President Aleksandar Vučić posed by the year-long student-led civic movement against his rule spurred by the Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse on November 1, 2024.
Finally, within the Union itself, in addition to the aforementioned Zagreb fixation on BiH, there are the right-wing and reactionary currents already salient, which have been buoyed by Trump’s return and all hope for Trump administration support in either remaining in power or gaining it. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán – a Dodik ally – just pocketed a one-year reprieve from US sanctions for oil and gas imports from Russia, as well as Trump’s coveted endorsement in the greatest electoral challenge Orbán has faced. The administration is not coy in seeking identity-based “civilizational alliance” with other right-wing forces in Europe. The thematic consistency with Dodik’s talking points – and not just his – ought to be clear.
For too long, the EU has downplayed its proclaimed democratic values in its talking points on the Western Balkans, while articulating them far more clearly (and appropriately) toward the three new eastern candidates. Sure, these remain represented in the cluster of “fundamentals” (democracy, rule of law, human rights, media freedom, anticorruption), but the policy attention remains concentrated in the transactional economic realm, as evidenced by the Growth Plan. Furthermore, while Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos leads the policy, her Director General – and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confidant – Gert Jan Koopman is most frequently in the region and his points focus on the economics, in a transactional frame.
The reality is that the EU’s avowed democratic values, genuinely sought by not just Bosnians of all self-identifications, but citizens throughout the nine candidate countries, have not been served in the Western Balkans by the Union’s policy posture. Messaging that enlargement is a geopolitical necessity, while a defensible position, articulated as such only reinforces the sense among those who hold power – whoever they may be – that they “hold the cards.” And note that Orbán’s advocacy for enlargement ASAP, beginning with Serbia, is precisely to strengthen his proverbial hand for a Union of nations.
The feared eventuality of the Trump administration adopting a Balkan policy reflecting its reactionary values may be coalescing. The policy of “Europe plus” – hoping only that the US remain relatively aloof, while continuing to pursue a policy essentially consistent with its 2006 assumptions – is no longer tenable. Nor is the seemingly prevailing idea that the EU’s proclaimed values can be sidelined in its competition with geopolitical adversaries, east and west. The EU faces enemies of its proclaimed values from both those directions – and within its membership.
The Western Balkans is the only front on earth in which the EU could currently be a decisive actor. To do so, it will have to radically deviate from its comfort zone. This turn must necessarily begin at the level of member states; countries like Denmark and the Netherlands must work to bring the EU’s largest member, Germany, vocally onto their line and demand a strategic recalibration in the region, beginning in BiH.