Aleksandar Vučić and his ruling SNS embraced early elections with gusto. Except for the 2020 parliamentary elections, each parliamentary election was held early—in 2014, 2016, 2022, and 2023. None of these elections was necessary, but they were motivated by the ruling party’s efforts to secure its rule at opportune moments, in the absence of a serious challenger.
This time it is different. The early elections Vučić called for 25 October 2026 were out of necessity, not opportunity. Vučić had been announcing his intention to hold early elections for months and apparently picked the date as his time ran out. He was under pressure to organize parliamentary elections before presidential elections, which were due in spring 2027 but are now to take place before the end of the year after Vučić resigned from the presidency. The presidential elections will be hard for the ruling SNS to win, as Vučić cannot run again and the party lacks a popular alternative. It is unlikely that a popular non-party candidate will be found. Clearly, the Progressive Party's strategy is to win parliamentary elections and carry that momentum into a presidential win. If it were to lose the presidency, it could concentrate power in the government.
Under pressure from the student movement, the momentum is turning against Vučić. When Vučić called the election, it was far from clear whether the student movement would be able to unify the opposition forces and create a referendum atmosphere. This has mostly succeeded. While there are two opposition lists: European Serbia brings together two parties and a group led by the Party for Freedom and Justice of Dragan Djilas and the Serbian Centre of former general Zdravko Ponoš. The other opposition list is called the ‘authentic right ‘, dominated by the Democratic Party of Serbia, campaigning on a nationalist and conservative platform. While there are few reliable polls yet, neither seems likely to enter parliament. Voters for both groups in the 2023 elections appear likely to switch to the Student List. This has several reasons. First, many might worry that the coalitions won't make it, thereby risking ‘wasting’ their votes. Second, the expected higher turnout will make it harder for them to enter parliament with their core supporters. The conservative coalition only had just over five per cent in 2023. The pro-European coalition was more successful, with 23,66 percent of the vote. However, most coalition parties switched to supporting the student list instead, including the Green-Left Front, the People’s Movement of Serbia and the Democratic Party.
The student list had a good start to the election campaign. Its list of candidates was a big surprise and lacked high-profile names, including polarizing candidates that might have alienated some voters. Attempts by regime media to smear individual candidates has not gained much traction. More importantly, the student movement appeared to regain the energy that had been less visible in recent months, organizing a countrywide campaign with a high turnout.
Thus, it seems likely that the student list will energize the opposition vote and bring out voters both in rural communities and abroad, where it has organized a voter-registration drive.
The ruling SNS has been on the defensive. One remarkable development that has received little attention is the ruling SNS's list of candidates. First, it includes not just the son of Vojislav Šešelj, Aleksandar, but also another prominent member of the radical party, Vjercia Radeta and the “Central Fatherland Administration” of the Radical Party decided to support the SNS list. This marks a historical reconciliation between Aleksandar Vučić and his political godfather, Vojislav Šešelj, who published books with such colorful titles as “The Serbian Baron Münchhausen Aleksandar Vučić” or “Sanader’s kitty Aleksandar Vučić.” More mundane is the fact that the SNS is running for the first time on its own. In all previous elections, the SNS always ran as part of a coalition of small parties, such as the Socialist Movement of Aleksandar Vulin, the parties of Bogoljub Karić Vuk Drašković, and many other minor political parties or faded politicians. While these were never important, they helped create the illusion of a broader movement. In 2026, it is just SNS alone. The political movement Vučić launched in 2023, “Movement for the People and the State,” has completely disappeared. Focusing on a narrow party list seems counterintuitive for the regime. There are two potential explanations. One, the SNS seeks to have several of these groups run independently to avoid a referendum-like atmosphere and muddy the waters between regime and opposition. This has failed spectacularly in the case of the Socialist Movement. Vulin’s pro-Russian party had already been sidelined in recent years and sought to form a pre-election coalition with “Mi-Snaga Naroda”, the pro-Russian, conspiracy-theory-populist group led by Branimir Nestorović. His party fell apart after he first disappeared and then reappeared, claiming at a press conference that he had been instructed by Moscow to form a pro-Russian coalition, during which he appeared rather disheveled. The attempt to create a populist pro-Russian coalition to run for elections thus failed. Other former allies, such as Draškovićs Serbian Renewal Movement, support the student list.
Thus, the attempt to have other groups running has only been a modest success. There is the Russian party and Karić’s Movement for the Power of Serbia. The party has been the vehicle of this businessman who built his company during the Milošević era and later in Russia and Belarus. Running alone on a pro-Russian populist platform might gain him some votes, but it is unlikely to be enough to secure entry to parliament.
The other reason for dumping the minor parties from the list might be motivated by post-election considerations. These parties might be tempted to break away from SNS if the student list wins. Thus, the decision not to run as a broad front under Vučić's banner seems defensive.
Only the Socialist Party of Serbia, a partner of SNS since 2012, seems likely to enter parliament. However, the party seems on a possibly irreversible decline. Its dominant president, Ivica Dačić, has had health issues, and the party has been increasingly marginalized by the SNS in recent years, resulting in visible dissatisfaction within it. It has switched its support several times in the past, being key in bringing SNS to power after previously cooperating with the Democratic Party. However, being a junior party for 14 years might make it hard for them to switch once more.
Another important actor will be minorities. As minority parties have a lower threshold than other parties, several minority MPs were elected in 2023; minority parties were represented by 13 MPs (out of 250). These might become an important actor in a tight race. While MPs for the Hungarian, Croat and Bosniak minorities supported Vučić in the past, this might shift. The Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians used to be loyal to both Orban and Vučić but has come under pressure from Hungary’s new Prime Minister Péter Magyar and might shift. Also, the three different Bosniak parties might support a student list.
The only opinion poll with some credibility gives the student list a slight advantage of 44.4% over the SNS’s 41.7%. The momentum is on the of the Student List, while the state media and the control over all institutions give the SNS an advantage. Overall, it seems likely that the election will be tight. The result will depend on voter turnout, the continued momentum of the student campaign, and whether domestic and international election observers can prevent election fraud in Serbia and at polling stations abroad, particularly in the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If the student list secures a majority on 25 October, it will not be easy to translate electoral success into rapid change. The first of several obstacles is that Vučić and the SNS are unlikely to hand over power as easily as Orbán did in Hungary. Thus, highly volatile days lie ahead after 25 October. Even if the student list gains power, it will be hard to achieve rapid and tangible change with a public administration controlled by SNS, and with hopes that a new government might quickly disintegrate. With major challenges and a minimalist platform, the risk of fractures is great.
For the first time in 14 years of Vučić increasingly authoritarian rule, political change appears possible, but the risks and obstacles remain formidable.
Photo credits: Stefan Simonovic