For anyone who has been following Kosovo's daily political dynamics over the past year, expectations for this year's report were low. And yet, perhaps to prove us wrong, the report, though it does not necessarily reflect substantive progress on reforms, carries a positive and encouraging tone. Almost as if Brussels is using this year's assessment to signal a fresh start after a turbulent period of more than two years under EU punitive measures, which considerably strained relations between Kosovo and the EU. This is even more relevant given that re-engagement following the full lifting of the measures has been far from smooth, with Kosovo's prolonged institutional crisis further complicating the resumption of political and institutional cooperation.

The more constructive tone seems to reflect an EU interest in rebuilding the relationship and creating the conditions for future cooperation, whether through the Growth Plan or the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. In that sense, the report is not so much celebrating Kosovo's achievements as trying to keep the door open for what might still be possible.

Undoubtedly, one of the most positive developments is the introduction of Chapter 31 on foreign, security, and defense policy. For the first time, Kosovo is formally assessed for its convergence and alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy under the Stabilization and Association Agreement. The report confirms what we already know: Kosovo’s full alignment with EU statements and restrictive measures. It formally recognizes an important dimension of Kosovo’s strategic orientation, one that has often received less political recognition than it deserves. In a geopolitical environment where the EU increasingly views enlargement through a security lens, this matters. Yet this recognition is also overdue. The commitment to align with the EU's foreign and security policy was already embedded in the SAA, signed in 2015. It has taken more than a decade for this dimension of the relationship to receive a formal assessment in the Commission's reporting. Better late than never, perhaps.

Yet, while Brussels has begun to show signs of willingness to make amends with Kosovo, domestic political paralysis has come at a considerable cost. Even while the punitive measures were in place, the EU kept the door open for Kosovo to benefit from the Growth Plan. Instead of using this momentum, Kosovo lost an estimated €43.8 million for failing to deliver on reforms by the June deadline, and more than €100 million could be at risk if the year-end deadlines are missed. Kosovo, it seems, never misses a chance to miss a chance, even when the window of opportunity is relatively narrow. The institutional impasse has cost Kosovo more than political credibility; it has resulted in tangible financial losses and risks further missed opportunities.

This brings us back to the familiar contradiction surrounding Kosovo’s merit-based EU perspective. Kosovo continues to call for candidate status and insists that its application for EU membership, submitted in December 2022, be addressed on merit. Yet the reporting period offers little evidence of the reform delivery needed to support this case. At the same time, Kosovo’s membership application clearly lacks a meaningful political response. The Commission says it stands ready to prepare an opinion if the Council asks. Instead, it could at least use this year's more constructive assessment to call on member states to take up and process the application. More than that, the EU needs to show the political will to move Kosovo toward candidate status.

The report is also encouraging in its assessment of Kosovo’s engagement in the EU-facilitated dialogue. However, progress remains largely technical, while the real challenge is implementing the Ohrid Agreement. No high-level meeting between Kosovo and Serbia has taken place since 2023. The EU has an interest in preserving the momentum created at the technical level and using it to regain the political leverage needed to move the process forward. With both countries having gone through election cycles, the Commission signals that Kaja Kallas remains ready to convene a high-level meeting when circumstances allow. This may point to an opportunity for renewed engagement once Serbia has formed a new government and both sides have legitimate representatives in place. Technical cooperation is a notable achievement given the circumstances, but it cannot become a substitute for political progress.

While the report's encouraging tone is welcome, it should not be mistaken for a clean slate. It appears the EU is trying to open the door to a more constructive relationship and to create the political conditions for the next step. But eventually, both sides will have to walk through it. At a time when enlargement is gaining momentum in the region, Kosovo cannot afford another year of waiting. The EU needs to move beyond keeping Kosovo's EU perspective alive in its annual reports and show the political courage to advance Kosovo's candidate status. Kosovo, in turn, needs to demonstrate that it is ready for that step by delivering on the reforms it has already committed to. Candidate status cannot be secured by simply asking for it. But neither should it remain indefinitely out of reach because the EU lacks the will to make a political decision.