The Student List’s victory in Serbia could mark a turning point not only for the country’s domestic politics but also for Kosovo Serbs and the future of the Belgrade-Prishtina Dialogue. The movement’s position on Kosovo remains firmly rooted in the Serbian Constitution, which considers Kosovo part of Serbia. Its representatives have also indicated that agreements reached by previous Serbian governments could be revisited if found to contradict the Constitution.
Yet there are reasons to look beyond this continuity with the previous government’s policy. The movement has explicitly committed itself to continuing the EU-facilitated Dialogue, with the stated aim of improving the position of local residents. Greater autonomy for Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities and Serb-inhabited areas outside these municipalities remains central to the Student List’s vision, partly corresponding to the objective of establishing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM). Moreover, the Student List has committed to advancing the rights of non-Serb communities in Kosovo, such as the Gorani. During nearly two years of student-led protests before the electoral victory, student activists visited Serb villages in Kosovo and spoke about the peaceful coexistence between Serbs and Albanians as a daily reality. All of this suggests a degree of openness to pragmatic engagement that could distinguish the new political leadership from its predecessors.
The real opportunity, however, lies in enabling Kosovo Serbs to regain political agency and free themselves from the political monopoly of Srpska Lista.
Breaking with Srpska Lista
The Student List has indicated that it would not cooperate with Srpska Lista, the Kosovo branch of the ousted Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). For more than a decade, Srpska Lista has consolidated its influence over political representation and public institutions, while maintaining close links with Belgrade. Its reach extends beyond Kosovo’s institutional framework into Serbia-run structures, particularly healthcare, education and parallel municipal administrations.
A first step towards dismantling this political monopoly would be to end the practice of appointing Srpska Lista representatives and affiliates to leadership positions in Serbia-run municipal structures. There is considerable overlap between the two systems, with some affiliates heading the provisional authorities Serbia maintains in Kosovo municipalities. Replacing politically compromised appointees with impartial, professionally qualified individuals would help separate public services from party control and reduce the use of Serbian state funding as an instrument of political loyalty. This should equally apply to staffing decisions made for Serbia-run cultural, healthcare and education institutions. Cutting Srpska Lista’s access to funding from and positions in the Serbia-run system would significantly weaken its ability to exert all-encompassing political control in the municipalities it governs.
Such a process must distinguish between committed Srpska Lista operatives and individuals who cooperated under political or economic pressure. Wholesale purges would replicate the very practices Srpska Lista has employed in recent years. The objective should be professionalisation, not political revenge against individuals trying to survive in a culture of profound political control.
The next Kosovo parliamentary and local elections, not due for several years, will provide the clearest test of whether this transformation can be achieved. Kosovo Serbs should have the opportunity to establish an independent, expert-led political list for the parliamentary elections and put forward credible candidates for municipal elections. Belgrade could support this process by guaranteeing that employment, social benefits and access to Serbian-funded services are not conditional on political allegiance. The choice of representatives must ultimately belong to Kosovo Serbs, not to whichever political leadership happens to govern Serbia.
This would constitute a significant step towards the Kosovo Serbs’ political emancipation. During the transition, however, intimidation by entrenched Srpska Lista networks remains a serious risk. Strengthening the presence of independent, professionally trained Kosovo Serb police officers in Serb-majority municipalities, particularly in the north, is therefore essential.
Reviving the Brussels Dialogue
These challenges cannot be addressed through domestic Serbian politics alone. They require renewed engagement in the Belgrade-Prishtina Dialogue, where the reintegration of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo’s police and judicial institutions should be an immediate priority.
The recent controversy surrounding the resignations of Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors also presents an opportunity. A new Serbian government should encourage the reintegration of qualified professionals and support the recruitment of new, independent candidates where necessary. The same principle should apply to the return of Kosovo Serbs to the police: the objective must be to establish a service trusted by all local communities and independent of political control.
A key test of the new Serbian government’s commitment to the rule of law will be its handling of the case against Milan Radoičić, the prime suspect in the September 2023 Banjska attack. Kosovo has repeatedly sought his extradition, after he admitted to organising the armed group responsible for the attack – a request Serbia under the SNS has consistently refused. However, change may be on the horizon. After the Student List’s electoral victory, a commission of Serbia’s Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office began examining the circumstances surrounding the original failure to remand Radoičić in custody, including the handling of the prosecutor’s request for detention, which could indicate a willingness to revisit the case. This is not yet evidence of accountability, but if followed by concrete judicial action, it could represent an important confidence-building measure in the Dialogue with Prishtina.
Such a development would also deprive Albin Kurti’s government of one of its strongest arguments against engaging with Belgrade: that dialogue is futile when Serbia provides protection to individuals suspected of serious crimes against Kosovo’s institutions and citizens. A credible Serbian response would therefore also put the responsibility on Prishtina to reciprocate, return to negotiations and pursue practical compromises rather than unilateral actions that further alienate Kosovo Serbs and strain Kosovo’s relations with Western partners.
Ultimately, the Student List’s victory presents an opportunity for both sides. For Kosovo Serbs, it could open the way to political emancipation from Belgrade’s party structures and meaningful participation in Kosovo’s institutions. For Belgrade and Prishtina, it could create conditions for a more constructive dialogue, focused not on competing claims over sovereignty but on improving people’s everyday lives – which, arguably, should be the most important goal of the Dialogue.